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CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY/
DEMOCRATIC AGENCY
Frank I. Michelman*

DROFESSOR Ackerman began by declaring the generation to be,

in his view, the "basic unit" in constitutional theory. I agree, and
draw from this pro-democratic premise a lesson with which I expect
he in turn would agree.
Ackerman did not expressly say in what enumeration, compiled for
purposes of what inquiry, the generation stands as the basic constitutional-theoretic unit. Context, however, easily fills that gap. When a
principal speaker in a conference on "Fidelity in Constitutional Theory" declares in somewhat combative voice what he thinks the "basic
unit" is and is not, he is telling you what he thinks there is, constitutionally speaking, that might be worthy of his faith. Not for Professor
Ackerman, then, "the clause"-for which read: some timelessly selfwarranting, autonomously speaking text. Not for him either "the theory"-for which read: some apple of the beholder's eye. Rather for
him the generation-forwhich read: the historically acting creator of
constitutional law.
The creator, that is, on a full and true view of who that is. To those
who already agree with him that proper use of the Constitution today
requires reference to past historical acts of constitutional creation,
Ackerman speaks of the need to reckon with a certain true fact about
acts of creation of our Constitution, to wit: They were done by a succession of somewhat spiritually separated generations. The Constitution we have is a product of a chronologically ordered but non-linear
("discontinuous" 1 ) series of creative political events, each one of
which rejected some but not all of its predecessors' basic normative
premises. As such, then, must the Constitution be construed.
Excellent. But when Ackerman posits the generation as the basic
object of fidelity-not the clause, not the theory-he certainly intends
a message also to those who still need convincing that proper use of
the Constitution today requires reference to past historical acts and
events. The message is: "It does." Constitutional law is constituted,
he declares, by a "conversation between generations."'2 Each generation of Americans is "obligated to honor" the creativities of every
predecessor generation (barren generations such as our own to date
perforce omitted from the rolls). Thus our task today is to say what
* Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University.
1. Bruce Ackerman, A Generationof Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1519, 1520
(1997).

2. I& at 1524.
3. I& at 1522.
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"their sound and fury" means.4 Thus never for the rest of time will
Americans-short of reconstituting themselves as some new and
other People-be free to leave off debating "the meaning of
Lochner."'
The message seemingly could not be clearer: The most compelling
what-there-is-to-be-faithful-to, constitutionally speaking, is human
political action, the political works and acts of generations. Fidelity
does not run to an impersonal prescriptive text that just happens,
Heaven only knows how, to be shining there before us in loco constitutionis. Whatever merits our acceptance-our "reception" 6 -as law
does so precisely by virtue of being the works and acts of the generations whose works and acts it is.
Observe, now, that the Constitution's meriting our reception for
that kifid of reason is quite different from its meriting our reception by
reason of being deemed by us, the current generation, to be probably
a right or good law for us, or at any rate to be probably pointing in the
general direction of that. It may be that the two kinds of reasons for
constitutional reception are related. I think they are, both because I
think that a current generation seeking a probably good or right law
for it has reason to give heed to certain similarly directed actions of
predecessor generations, and because I think that integrity counts in
deciding what would be a right or good law for us. 7 But of course it's
not for me alone to decide such matters on my generation's behalf.
That is why my own perception of a connection between two kinds of
reasons for constitutional reception-that prior generations so acted,
and that my generation so decides for itself-in no way dissolves the
radical conceptual difference between the two.
One could wonder whether some inclination to past-oriented reasons for constitutional reception is already implicit in our agreement
here, on this occasion, to probe the matter of "fidelity" in constitutional theory. Had we started from the supposition that what putatively grounds a constitution's claim on our reception is not that some
historical actor uttered it but rather that we as current generation find
it to be instinct with some attractive normative ideal, then it seems
that our focal issue here might have been not "fidelity" but rather
criticism in constitutional theory. Criticism, I mean in the discursive
and disciplinary sense: The sense, that is, of bringing one's evaluation
of a performance into consonance with one's interpretation of a standard for evaluation of performances of that kind, while reciprocally
bringing one's interpretation of the standard into consonance with
one's evaluation of the performance. (Compare "reflective equilib4. ld. at 1523 (emphasis added).
5. Id- at 1527.
6. kla at 1524.
7. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire ch. VI (1986).

1997]

FIDELITY AS SYNTHESIS

1539

rium.") 8 We might, I am saying, have taken the central problem of
constitutional law to be not that of diachronically tracking between
what was written in at time one and what is read out at time two, but
rather that of a current generation's synchronically tracking between a
received or occurrent practice and an imperfectly comprehended
idealization of it, between an instance and a contestable standard.
If there really is such a gap as I'm working here to open between
fidelity and criticism, then does it pose some sort of practical choice
for constitutional interpreters? I do have in mind such a choice. On
the side of fidelity, interpreters can strain within limits (that are themselves read out of the legal practice-in-fact that stands to be faithfully
rendered) to make the Constitution's current meaning-in-application
a true rendition of the sum of the prescriptive vectors of the works of
the generations. On the side of criticism, interpreters can strain within
limits (that are themselves contained in the idealization of the practice-in-fact by which we criticize and strive to correct it) to make the
Constitution's current meaning-in-application carry forth or steer toward some relatively more abstract and timeless yet incomplete and
contested ideal of what a constitution is, what end or ends it properly
serves in the view of us the living.
At stake in this tussle between faithful and critical constitutional
interpretation, I believe, is democratic political agency or freedom.
That is because, as far as I can see, the exercise of any generation's
political freedom cannot consist in anything other than its collective
negotiation of the dialectical tension-the interpretative space-between its actually accepted (criticizeable) political practices and professions and their corresponding (contestable, emergent) political
ideals.9 Since only by and within an already constituted political society can that sort of negotiation occur, some measure of constitutional
fidelity is prerequisite to democratic agency. Without an established
set of norms to draw upon, there is no telling what events ought to
count as an expression of "the people's" will or "the people's" judgment in any generation. Yet because the space of the negotiation is
the space of democratic agency, agency stands to be constricted by
whatever would constrict the negotiation space, and that has to include fidelity to ancestral prescription. This looming adversity between fidelity and agency is, I believe, a matter for which Professor
Ackerman's work has shown too little concern.
Tentatively, then: What might be the incompletely comprehended,
contestable end with which, in the "critical" approach to constitutional interpretation, the Constitution-as-applied is to be brought into
a reflective equilibrium? For Bruce Ackerman, author of both Social
8. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51 (1971).
9. See Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12 Const. Commentary 227,
239-42 (1995).

1540

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Justice in the Liberal State10 and We the People," it would seem that
the end ought to be liberal democracy, the project of a diverse population's living together as free and equal consociates, by laws that they
jointly hammer out for themselves. Yet, as I've already noted, one
might gather from Ackerman's rhetoric on this occasion-constitutonal law is a "conversation between generations," etc.-that the
end of democracy calls for a dominance of diachronic fidelity over
synchronic critical agency in constitutional-legal work.
Such a teaching, if intended, would flow in the first place from insistence that democracy is, in essence, a matter of abiding by whatever
law the People institutionally decide upon from time to time-meaning, in practice, by "the People," a sufficient mobilized preponderance
to figure as the whole. Of course, such a nakedly procedural view of
what democracy is or requires is currently under siege. Ronald Dworkin, for example, argues forcefully that it's not a procedure but rather
a state of political affairs that Americans deeply mean by "democracy," posited as an end for basic political arrangements.' 2 In the tussle I have set up between the call of fidelity and the call of criticism,
arguments of that kind weigh on the side of criticism. I don't pause
over them, because my aim here is to raise the issue between fidelity
and agency within the proceduralist camp of democratic theorists.
Ackerman's pro-fidelity argument from procedural democracy
comes down, I think, to this. Democracy just does mean self-rule by
the People; that is what Americans have always meant by the notion.
True, this root idea of the American People ruling themselves leaves
us with the problem of telling when the People have spoken law; it
gives us need for a rule of recognition of the People legislating. But
the root idea that raises the need also points to the form of the only
admissible answer to it, which is to draw the rule of recognition from
the actual historical practice of the country. The country came to treat
the semi-lawlessly enacted Constitution of the 1780s as highest law, as
it did the semi-lawlessly enacted Reconstruction amendments and as it
now does (so Ackerman contends and many adamantly deny) an undocumented constitutional-legal quasi-enactment of the New Deal
era. 3 The country thus shows to itself what it counts as an apparition
of the legislating People. On this matter as on others, our task is noth10. Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980).

11. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991) [hereinafter Ackerman,

We the People].
12. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law ch. 1 (1996).
13. In other words, by Ackerman's account (roughly rendered) the People served
notice of their aroused presence on the higher-lawmaking stage in the 1780s, and
again in the 1860s, by approving inventive and formally extra-legal deployments by
the branches of government of conventionally recognizable components of popularlybased-lawmaking-and by similar means in the 1930s accomplished an amendmentlike transformation of constitutional law without anyone's professing to Jay hands on
the documentary text. See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (forthcoming 1997).
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ing more nor less than to listen to ourselves. What could be more in
the spirit of democracy than popular self-rule?
The difficulty is as it has ever been (call it "counter-majoritarian,"' 4
call it "inter-temporal" 5). They-the generations of the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal-are not us the living. I would be
amazed to hear Professor Ackerman proclaiming that they were. But
given that they are not, for us to submit in any degree to governance
by their say-so-including not least their say-so regarding rules of recognition-is for us in that same degree to be not governing ourselves.
Agreed, wholeheartedly, no person is an island. Agreed, persons
identify, in part, with political communities. Agreed, political communities have heritages, and Lochner is a part of ours, and it's therefore a
part of our constitutional fate as Americans to converse forever over
the meaning of Lochner. Nevertheless I maintain that a democratic
conversation is not inter-generational; it is intra-generational. What a
prior generation said and did by the cluster of speech acts we call
Lochner is one question. What we might mean by Lochner is another
question. What they said or did, as distinguished from what we might
mean, may matter for purposes of community on some (not-too-liberal) notion of what community is. It may matter for purposes of integrity, and integrity may be an entailment of democracy on a
substantive, Dworkinian view of what democracy is or requires.16 The
point remains that what some prior generation did as distinguished
from what we might do is extraneous to democracy on an ultimately
procedural, Ackermanian view of what democracy is or requires,' 7 as
long as it remains agreed that they are not us.
Professor Ackerman has a way of responding to the sort of tirade
I've just launched. It is this: Granted, predecessor generations are
not us. Neither, on good authority, is Congress us, nor any other organ of representative government.' If what we mean by democracy is
the rule of the People, we must also understand that this People appears in action only sporadically, in moments of exceptional political
mobilization which it may not be granted to every generation to know.
So in this world of generational finitude and change (not to add, of
14. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16-23 (1962).
15. Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale
L.. 1013, 1045-47 (1984).

16. See Dworkin, Freedom's Law, supra note 12.
17. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 11, at 6-16.

18. See Frank I. Michelman, Foreword." Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L
Rev. 4, 75 (1986).

The Air Force is not us. Congress is not us. The President is not us. "We"
are not "in" those bodies. Their determinations are not our self-government. Judges overriding those determinations do not, therefore, necessarily
subtract anything from our freedom, although the judges also, obviously, are
not us.
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variable stature among the generations), to ask for perfect democracy
is to ask for too much. The best that any on-coming generation can
do, if it means to be ruled by the People, is to receive as its law the
most recent word from an adequately mobilized American citizenry,
pending that on-coming generation's own arousal (if ever) of the People slumbering within it.
Ackerman's work thus regards a particular generation's slumber as
a given fact for theory's mill: In fact this generation slumbers, so in
theory this generation takes its constitutional law from the past. But it
seems that those committed to democracy must also regard such cases
as deviations from an ideal of active self-government, for theory to
address reparatively.
Therefore, I want to say, there are two theoretical projects. I have
already suggested reasons for thinking that neither can proceed very
well or far without reference to the other, but still there are two
projects. There is the project of clarifying certain categories of the
concept of democratic constitutional fidelity and proposing institutional forms for them, and there is a parallel project for the concept of
democratic constitutional agency. Regarding fidelity, two main categories occupy the sizable literature. The category of inter-generational
correspondence, between what we the People willed then and what
someone heeding our will from afar rules today in our name, motivates various prescriptive theories of legal interpretation over time
gaps. 19 The category of a People exercising a will motivates Professsor
Ackerman's strivings to arrive at institutional paradigms of formal and
non-formal higher lawmaking by the People. 0
If, then, those are the categories of the concept of democratic constitutional fidelity for which scholars endeavor to supply substantive
clarification and institutional form, what would be the corresponding
categories of the concept of democratic constitutional agency for
which we have comparable needs? I suggest the following pair. First,
there is the category of the contestable ideal or standard, with revisionary reference to which a generation committed to the end of jointly
and severally free self-government can, with a view to that end, collectively and critically reexamine the course of its public affairs. How do
a generation's worth of people determine and express a content for
this necessarily public and shared critical standard, and what can theory say about this content?
Second, there is the category of the critical reexamination as itself a
process of popular self rule. What are the institutional forms and arrangements that can constitute a normatively self-governing generation out of continuing, critical exchange among (1) the claims and
views of individuals, (2) an influential body of public opinion regard19. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelityand Constraint,65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365 (1997).
20. See Ackerman, We the People, supra note 11, passim.
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ing the rightness of existing or proposed constitutional-legal arrangements, and (3) the collective (majoritarian or super-majoritarian) acts
of legally authorized makers and interpreters of constitutional law inrepresentative legislative assemcluding, as applicable, electorates,
21
blies, and constitutional courts?
It seems to me a whole lot easier to identify scholarly workers on
the categories of democratic constitutional fidelity than scholarly
workers on the categories of democratic constitutional agency. Our
pool of talents and energies is not unlimited, and I am not sure why
we budget as we do.

21. See Frank I. Michelman, Book Review, 93 J. Phil 307, 312-14 (1996) (reviewing Jirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996)).

